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Income Inequality and the Probability of Violent Revolt 
Noah Cecil, Economic Honors '06-'07 
This paper examines the effect of income inequality on the impetus of an organized dissident 
group to initiate a "revolt" in an attempt to wrest power from the government regionally or 
countrywide. After suggesting alterations and extensions of a mathematical framework 
developed by Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana (2004) income inequality, economic growth, 
urbanization, and political rights data from 102 countries from 1972-1999 are used to determine 
their respective influences on the likelihood of a revolt being initiated in a given year. Income 
inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient is found to be statistically significant in 
determining the likelihood of the start of politically motivated conflict, as is political openness, 
and economic growth while the overall predictive power of the model is found to be weak. 
1. Introduction 
The relationship between economic conditions and political climate has been examined 
extensively. The aspect of the political envimnment of particular interest in this paper is 
the likelihood of non-electoral attempts to seize governing power given certain economic 
conditions. Previous authors have studied the relationship between economic growth, 
investment, or income inequality and various measures of political violence (Gurr, 1970; 
Muller and Seligson, 1987; Blomberg and Hess, 2002; Feng, 2003; Blomberg, Hess, and 
Weerapana, 2004). The causal relevance of economic inequality in attempts to oust a 
governing body has been considered by some; however, its affect has been primarily 
examined in the context of individual countries over time rather than across countries. 
This paper looks at the effect that the level of inequality in different countries has on the 
respective likelihood of revolt in each. After a review of background literature I present a 
theoretical model that links economic conditions to the decision of an organized dissident 
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group to either revolt or accept the status quo. The empirical analysis consists of cross-
sectional data from 102 countries over the period of 1972-1999. In concordance with the 
implications of the model of Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana (2004), Collier (2004) as 
well as the work of Muller and Seligman (1987) it is argued that, controlling for various 
other economic and social factors, the likelihood of revolt in a country in a given year is 
positively correlated with that country's level of income inequality. 
2. Literature Summary 
Coups d'etat, guerilla warfare, and terrorist attacks all constitute means of political 
violence that serve to either influence or remove the governing body of a nation. The 
decision to participate in political actions such as these has been reviewed by various 
authors. Obviously, the choice to participate in any such potentially violent political 
activity is not determined solely, or perhaps even primarily, by economic considerations. 
The influence of beliefs and the level of unity within a cultural or political group on the 
probability of attempted terrorist attacks have been examined by Epstein and Gang 
(2002), Bernholz (2003), and Wintrobe (2002). Similarly, the relative level of centralized 
power within a country as an incentive to participate in violent political activity has been 
studied by Frey and Luechinger (2004). Krueger and Maleckova (2003) have examined 
the sociological background informing those who participate in terrorist activities. An 
entire field dedicated to the study of the social and political structures that lend 
themselves to violent political revolt exists within the discipline of political science. The 
aim ofthis paper then is to demonstrate that income inequality is one influential factor 
among others that determine the probability of violent revolt, not that income inequality 









The theoretical foundations that link income inequality and the likelihood of 
extralegal political action are closely related and indebted to literature concerned with the 
relation of political stability and macroeconomic indicators. Many works have 
contributed to an explanatory scheme of how and why economic expansion and 
contraction tend to influence the provision of political rights and civil liberties. Some 
have argued that increased prosperity in terms of increased real per capita GDP 
distributed among a significant portion of the population will tend to increase popular 
receptivity to democratic rule (Lip set, 1959; Leftwich, 1996; Feng, 2003; Friedman, B. 
2005). A divergent but similar argument favors the structure, rather than magnitude, of 
economic interaction as being the primary economic influence on governmental 
character. This is to say centralized command economies, or the feudal system, or free-
market forms of economic interaction that generate the same per capita income 
distributed among the same proportion of citizens would each influence receptivity to 
democratic rule in differing degrees. According to this view, more diffuse economic 
rights tend to encourage political participation and opposition to centralized or 
authoritarian rule and economic characteristics s.uch as robust growth and increased trade 
tend to result in democratic governance (Friedman, M. 1962; Putnam, 1993; Huber, 
Rueshmeyer, and Stephens, 1993). 
These theories concerning the affect of economy on governmental structure are 
not universally supported. Barro sees "the (theoretical) connection between political and 
economic freedom as controversial" (Barro, 1998) Citing the work of Sirowy and Inkeles 
(1993) as well as Przeworski and Limongi (1993), Barro argues that economic conditions 
like high growth rates and low income inequality do not have a clear connection to a free 
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political environment. In contrast to his doubts concerning the theory underlying the 
relationship between robust macroeconomic health and democratic rule, Barro fmds a 
"strong empirical regularity" in the relationship (Barro, 1998, pg.52). 
Rather than focus on the phenomenon of state-formation through the effects of 
growth or income inequality, this paper focuses on the initiation of extralegal political 
conflict. Theoretical work regarding the relationship between economic inequality and 
the probability of extralegal political activity in the form of revolution is extensive. Ted 
Robert Gurr (1970) and Charles Tilly (1973) have authored theses that, in addition to 
sociological characteristics, suggest that the economic reality faced by potential 
dissidents plays a major role in their decision to participate in a rebellion. 
An alternative thesis authored by Theda Skocpol and Jeff Goodwin (1989) holds 
that economic conditions within a country, including economic inequality, do not playa 
significant role in prompting revolutions. In response to the theses of Gurr and Tilly they 
argue that the events and conditions that prompt revolt, instead of being primarily related 
to social and economic conditions, are related to the role and stature of the state as well as 
the ability of the populace to mobilize. In their view, "socioeconomic deprivation", 
poverty, and general economic inequality are constants for the populace that would 
potentially participate in a revolt, namely peasants, the proletariat, and the middle-class. 
They state that "the 'misery breeds revolt' hypothesis does not explain very much. Leon 
Trotsky once wrote that the 'mere existence of privations is not enough to cause an 
insurrection; if it were, the masses would be always in revolt. '''(McClintock, 1998, p.23) 
Among the important insights offered by Skocpol and Goodwin, the level of organization 
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and authoritarianism of the incumbent governing body will be of particular importance in 
the construction of the model. 
A moderate rebuttal of this formulation of the structure and mechanisms of 
revolution Timothy Wickham-Crowley (1989) examines the correlation between the 
socioeconomic conditions in twenty-four cases of successful, failed, and partially 
successful revolutionary movements in Latin America. His study focuses on the effects 
that peasant support for revolution, guerilla military strength, incumbent regime type, 
land distribution, and other sociological variables had on the success of revolutionary 
movements. He found that Skocpol and Goodwin's thesis is compelling in a certain 
sense, but mistaken in proposing that inequality plays no part in the formation of 
revolutionary movements. His analysis indicates that regime type played a major role in 
the success and catalysis of revolutionary movements. In addition to this affect of regime 
type, he determined that the Latin American countries that experienced an increase in the 
concentration of land ownership in a given period were much more likely to experience a 
revolution in subsequent periods than countries that had relatively disperse land 
ownership. 
This focus on the affect of land distribution on the likelihood of revolution has 
been criticized by Muller and Seligson (1987) and McClintock (1998). These analysts 
argue that land ownership is a proxy for the real motive of revolt. They suggest that it is 
income inequality, or inequality in the distribution of the means by which one achieves a 
given level of well-being, that prompts revolution, not landownership as such. Muller 
and Seligson address multiple theories of revolution. An important point they make in 
response to those who argue that worsening, or consistently poor, economic conditions 
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have little to do with the formation of extralegal political movements given their ubiquity, 
is that inequality may exist in every society but it exists in differing degrees. Obvious as 
this observation appears, it serves as a point of departure for the analysis of influence of 
income inequality on the level of political violence. Controlling for economic 
development, political repressiveness, and the intensity of separatism, their empirical 
analysis regresses the number of political deaths per million people in a given country on 
the proportion of income held by the richest quintile. The affect of income inequality 
was found to be statistically significant. 
This paper draws from the conceptual basis of Muller and Seligson (1987), but 
differs from their work in various ways. First, they utilize the number of politically-
related deaths in a country to measure the level of political violence. The analysis in this 
work focuses on the choice to attempt to undertake a revolt or not. The occurrence of a 
"revolution start" in a given year will be determined using the definition of revolution as 
well as the starting dates given by Gurr and Harff (2000). The likelihood of this 
categorical event will then be related to the level of income inequality. As mentioned 
above, Muller and Seligson use the proportion of income accruing to the richest 20% of 
the population to reflect income distribution across the popUlation. They suggest that the 
proportion of income held by the richest portion of the popUlation is more salient in the 
consideration of those who might opt to revolt thaD. a measure, such as the Gini 
coefficient, which is more sensitive to income disparities in the middle deciles of the 
national income distribution. It may be true that a measure which is reactive to unequal 
distribution among middle-income groups is not an ideal measure of income inequality in 
a society, but some inclusion of the levels of income distribution among those who are 
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not in the highest income quintile is preferable to none. It is conceivable in the 
relationship proposed by Muller and Seligman that two countries may have the same 
proportion of income accruing to the richest 20% of the population yet have highly 
divergent levels of income distribution among the remainder of society. Presumably, 
there would be differing resultant probabilities of political violence, but these differing 
probabilities would not be captured by the use of just the income of the richest quintile. 
Thus, some measurement which incorporates the income concentration in the rich as well 
as poorer part of the population would seem preferable. Additionally, this paper provides 
a different conceptual framework than that of Muller and Seligman. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) examine similar effects of income inequality in 
determining the likelihood of civil war. In a paper concerning the motivations of 
dissident groups in pursuing violent political action, they examine the predictive power of 
a large group of variables such as per capita GDP, education levels, percent ofland 
forested, and a constellation of other potential determinants. The number of variables 
included in the regression is impressive. However, there are multiple problems with their 
model that are absent in the empirical analysis below. For instance, they aggregate 
economic variables, such as per capita growth and income inequality, across five-year 
intervals and use these aggregates to determine the likelihood of a civil war beginning in 
the same five-year interval. The issue of simultaneous determination between growth 
and the occurrence of civil war in the same interval' of time is not addressed. Inclusion of 
a variety of collinear variables also appears to reduce the efficacy of the regression. 
While this paper may suffer from omission of relevant variables such as those that might 
capture the degree of divisiveness in a society or availability of warring capital, the work 
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of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) seems to suffer from inclusion of irrelevant variables. 
This paper also differs from their work in its definition of revolt, the time interval used to 
measure the beginning of conflict, and its explicit extension and application of a 
theoretical model of the economic motivations for revolt. 
The work drawn upon most heavily is the theoretical work of Blomberg, Hess, 
and Weerapana (2004). Prior to developing their mathematical model, though, Blomberg 
and Hess (2002) examined the empirical relationship between economic growth and 
external and internal armed conflict. To model this relationship they use two-stage 
Markov processes wherein the conditional probability of conflict, internal or external, is 
measured given the state of growth, defined as either positive or negative, in the previous 
year. Whereas in this paper a regression utilizing the magnitudes ofthe determinant 
variables (e.g. growth, inequality) is estimated, Blomberg and Hess compare the 
probability of internal conflict occurring in some period t contingent upon the categorical 
variable of growth( contraction) and internal or external peace( conflict) in period t-1 . The 
use of Markov processes in examining the correlation between growth and conflict or 
peace helps in the simplification of the analysis, and after controlling for different 
country characteristics such as the region and government type they found a statistically 
significant relationship between recession in an economy and increased likelihood of 
conflict in the country the following year. Additionally, non-African countries as well as 
those with a democratic form of government were less likely to experience political in 
periods following recession. 
In a later paper, Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana (2004) borrowed the general 
framework of a model developed by Tornell (1998) to construct a theoretical model for 
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the decision of political dissidents to undertake a violent attack on the government based 
on a constellation of economic and social factors. Tornell's model examines the decision 
of an economically and politically powerful group to willingly "relinquish its privileges" 
so as to make it economically worse off thfu"1 before. In the long term, though, 
circumstances are better for the group vis-a.-vis its economic opponents than they 
otherwise would have been. An important aspect of Tornell's model that is present in 
Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana's model as well as this paper is the access that each 
group has to the economic resource. Each group has open access to the resource and 
their extraction rates are constrained by the condition that the government extraction rate 
exceeds that of the dissident group. These conditions cause peaceful status quo to 
eventually devolve into economic crisis due to the rational decision by each group to 
over-extract from the stock of economic resources. This leads to two possible reform 
patterns: simultaneous reform by both groups, or an earlier reform by one group. 
Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana alter this conceptual scheme to fit the 
considerations of potential political dissidents. They examine how, within their 
framework, political conflict might be influenced by the rate of growth, relative levels of 
appropriation of economic resources by the two groups, and the likelihood of success of a 
revolt. 
In their earlier empirical examination of conflict and economic conditions 
Blomberg and Hess (2002) argue that as growth declines or as a contraction worsens, the 
payoff to dissidents of maintaining the status quo rather than revolting declines. 
Eventually the payoff to revolt outstrips the benefits of maintaining the status quo, thus 
the dissident group probabilistically chooses to revolt. They also mention that 
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contraction of the economy is not the only way in which this cost-benefit tradeoff 
changes. They identify the relative rate of appropriation of economic resources by 
potential rebels and those in power as a characteristic of the model that also alters the 
probability of revolt. 
3. Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual model and mathematical framework developed in the analysis of 
Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana (2004) is extended here in an analysis of the probability 
of revolution in countries with differing levels of income inequality. 
In a given time period t in country j there exists a stock of resources, at. This 
stock of resources could be an asset such as natural resources (e.g. lumber, oil, coal, fish) 
or fiscal resources. In this paper the GDP of a country is taken to reflect the size of this 
stock of economic resources. The stock is appropriated by two organized groups-those 
who are in power, or "oligarchs", and those who are not in power, or "dissidents"-as 
well as a third group that constitutes the remainder of society. * Each group extracts 
resources from the total stock at differing rates. Oligarchs extract resources at a rate ofy, 
dissidents extract resources at a rate of 8, and the remainder of society extracts at some 
rate A. S The extraction rates of each group may total to a rate greater than the raw growth 
rate ofthe resource. In fact, as in Tomell (1998) and Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana 
(2004) the two groups rationally extract at a rate greater than the growth rate of the stock. 
Additionally, oligarchs always extract resources at a greater rate than dissidents, that is, 
• This theoretical model borrows substantially from "An Economic Model of Terrorism" by Blomberg, 
Hess, and Weerapana (2004), who in turn borrowed the main body of their model from "Reform from 
Within" by Tomell (1998). 
S For the sake of simplicity, the marginal utility of the resource is constant. However, it is reasonable to 
believe that the marginal utility of the modeled resource would be diminishing. Incorporating this aspect of 
the resource would strengthen the implication that increased inequality would increase the payoff of revolt. 
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y > o. This extraction of resources from the common stock can be conceived of as the 
income accruing to each group. The stock of resources has a raw growth rate OfK. As 
the size of the economy is taken to reflect the size of this stock of resources, economic 
growth reflects the value of this parameter. The growth of the stock of economic 
resources from which these groups appropriate is given as: 
The stock of resources appropriated by just the dissident group and the oligarch group is 
affected by the raw growth rate of the total stock and the extraction rate of the remainder 
of society. To simplify the formulation the raw growth rate and the remainder of 
society's extraction rate will be combined to show the effective growth rate ~ = (K- A,) of 
the stock of resources appropriated by only dissidents and oligarchs. The growth of this 
stock is given as: 
In every time period the dissident group has three options. They can either 
choose to accept the status quo, attempt to effect legal change, or undertake a "rebellion". 
The cost of rebelling is an expended fraction of the economic resources appropriated 
from the total stock. That is, at some time 't dissidents may choose to form a rebellion 
that lasts h periods, expending some fraction l E (0,1) of the economic resources it 
appropriates . The dissident group's expenditure during the h periods of revolt cannot 
exceed its cumulative appropriation from the stock of resources during the h periods of 
revolt. The model also incorporates a subjective time preference, p, for the consumption 
of potential resources. A successful rebellion results in the deposition of the oligarchs 
11 
and a new extraction rate for dissidents. Their new extraction rate is y-that of the 
deposed oligarchs. The oligarch group may then dissipate into the indifferent third party 
or remain as an organized group. 
The dissident group faces uncertainty as to the outcome of an attempted revolt. 
The parameter 8 reflects the expected likelihood of a successful revolt. Though in their 
model they do not link the parameter 8 to the proportion of resources the dissident group 
expends in the revolt, Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana (2004) mention that the likelihood 
of success is probably positively correlated with dissidents' proportional expenditures. 
However, it is not just the dissidents' proportional expenditure of resources but its total 
resource expenditure that influence its likelihood of revolutionary success. Ceteris 
paribus, it would be reasonable to assume that a dissident group would be more likely to 
succeed if they dedicated a greater absolute amount of resources to a revolt, not just a 
greater proportion of their resources.* Thus, as the dissidents' extraction rate increases 
relative to the oligarchs' their likelihood of success increases; and as their extraction rate 
declines relative to that of the oligarchs, their likelihood of success decreases. Therefore, 
in addition to various social and political characteristics of the country, the probability of 
success, 8, is a function of the relative extraction rates of the dissidents. All this implies 
that 8(8)/8(y-8) < O. 
The second option-a legal attempt to change the policy of the government-
takes a similar form. The extraction rates (y, 8), effective growth rate (~), the duration of 
• This is in accord with the work of Grossman (1991) who links potential dissidents' allocation of time 
between labor and revolt with the soldiering technology of the oligarchs and the dissidents and, by 
extension, their likelihood of success. 
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the legal action (h periods), and the likelihood of success, OJ are the same.s One 
difference is the lower cost of this action. The cost of a legal attempt to depose the 
oligarchs is qLE (0,1) and defined as (1 - a) l. The a term, which ranges from 0 to 1, 
captures the effectiveness of legal political dissent. As more effective channels for legal 
political influence open a increases and the cost of a legal attempt to change the 
government relative to the cost-of a revolt decreases. The payoff for a successful legal 
action also differs. In the event of a successful attempt to legally change the government 
the extraction rate of the dissidents increases but not by as much as it would in the case of 
a successful revolt. When the present oligarchic group is removed legally, the new 
governing group concedes a share of its extraction to the dissidents. The new extraction 
rate of the dissident group is some fraction, 7t, of the extraction rate that it would have 
enjoyed in the case of a successful revolt (y) and exceeds its old extraction rate, 7ty> 8. 
Additionally, the new oligarch extraction rate, "I., equals 8 + (1 - n)y. Thus, the new 
extraction rates sum to the old extraction rates (X + 7ty = Y + 8). 
The dissident group could also choose to maintain status quo by not attacking. 
This third option forgoes both the costs and benefits associated with rebellion or legal 
change. 
There are a few additional assumptions borrowed from the Blomberg, Hess, and 
Weerapana model that are important to mention. First, though it is counter-intuitive, the 
model assumes that a revolt occurring in country j will not affect that country's economic 
growth rate. Numerous authors (Barro, 1998; Elbadawi, 1999; Collier, 1999; Feng, 
S Though modeling the probability of legal success and extralegal success as equal may appear odd, recall 
that for this given level of probable success the resources expended in a revolt are set to be greater than 
those expended in a legal political action. 
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2003) have found that economic growth is negatively effected by political volatility. 
Thus, it would appear that in the case of a revolt the growth rate would be reduced, both 
in the period of revolt and the period after revolt. Additionally, the dissident and oligarch 
extraction rates are apparently not predicated upon any type of technological expertise or 
other particular group characteristics. This assumption allows any group, regardless of 
the human capital of the group, to fill the role of "oligarch" and extract at the oligarch 
rate. Given that a group's appropriation of goods from the stock of economic resources 
does depend on their respective levels of education, technological expertise, and in many 
instances, the trust of international investors, it might be more convincing to model the 
dissident's resulting extraction rate in the event of a successful revolt as greater than its 
prior extraction rate 8, but not as great as the oligarch's prior extraction rate y. However, 
these assumptions greatly simplify the model and allow it to serve as an informative 
framework in which the relation between economic circumstances and the decision to 
initiate a revolt may be better understood. 
To determine the benefits accruing to dissidents in any of these situations we 
integrate their payoff functions over each of the three time periods-the time before 
potential, during, and after the potential revolt. In the case that the dissident group 
chooses not to revolt their benefit function is the same for each period and takes the form: 
SeT) = [ 8aoeCP- r- o- p)sds 
(1 ) 
To determine the benefit function that arises in the case of a revolt, two components that 
are absent in Equation 1 must be added to Equation 2. First, the cost that is expended 
(l) during the h periods necessary to overt.hrow the government is included in the 
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second integral below. The third integral reflects the resulting extraction rate in the event 
of failure, which occurs with probability (1- e), and the fourth integral shows the 
extraction rate in the case of success, which occurs with probability e. 
In this model, as in Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana, it is assumed that the 
government does not seek any retributive revenge. If the dissident group in fact fails in 
their attempt to overthrow the government this assumption leaves them with the same 
benefit function that they had prior to the revolt. The payoff to revolt takes the form: 
R( r) = r DaoecP-r-o-p)s ds + I+h DaoeCP-r-8-p)S (1 - qR )ds 
+ (1 - 8) i 00 eCP-r-o-p)s ds + e r ya eCP-r-o-p)s ds 
,l.+h 0 l+h 0 
The expected benefit function in the case of a legal attempt to change the 
(2) 
government takes a similar form. Up until time 't the dissident group has the status quo 
payoff. The fraction of income expended on legal political action during the h periods of 
activity is included in the second integral. The payoff resulting from a failed attempt and 
the payoff resulting from a successful attempt are multiplied by their respective 
likelihoods. 
L(r) = r oooecP-r-o-p)sds+ rh oooeCP-r-ti-p)s(1-a)qRds 
+ (1 - 8) r 00 eCP-r-8-p)s ds + e r (7T'II)a eCP-z-nr-p)sds 
l+h 0 l+h'" 0 
In the process of deciding whether to revolt or maintain the status quo, the 
(3) 
dissident group would compare the costs and benefits implied by the above functions. In 
order to determine the economic outcome of this decision we simply look at the 
difference between the two integrals: 
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(4) 
The difference in benefits over the period of revolt from that of status quo is the 
dissidents' expenditure of appropriations from the common resource stock, thus -c/, the 
proportion of benefits expended, multiplies the integral totaling the benefits that accrue to 
the group over the time period ofthe revolt. Finally, the probability of success multiples 
the integral that determines the difference between the extraction rates in the event of 
success, y, and in the event of failure, O. 
The process of weighing the decision to attempt a legal removal of the present 
governing group of oligarchs rather than accept the present political-economic situation is 
similar. The expected payoff to a legal attempt to remove the oligarchs would be: 
L(1') - S(1') = N L (1') = -(1 - a)qR [+h liaoe(P-r-o-p)s ds + () [h (10/ - 8)aoe(P-r-
o-p)s ds 
(5) 
The difference in benefits over the period of political activity, derives from the 
dissidents' expenditure of appropriations from the common resource stock, qL . The 
proportion of benefits expended multiplies the integral totaling the benefits that accrue to 
the group over the time period of the activity. Note that as a approaches 1, that is, as the 
country becomes more democratic and more effective channels of legal dissent open, the 
cost of legal political action approaches O. Finally, the probability of success multiples 
the integral that determines the difference between the extraction rates in the event of 
success, ny, and in the event of failure, O. 
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In order to determine the preference of a legal attempt to remove the oligarchs 
over a revolt or vice versa, the dissident group would compare the expected benefit 
functions. Subtracting the expected benefits of legal political dissent (Equation 5) from 
the expected benefits of revolt (Equation 4) gives the expected benefits of revolt relative 
to legal action: 
N R (r) - N L (r) = _aqR f+h Oct eCP-r-o-p)s ds + () [ (1 - ;r)ra eCP-r-o-p)s ds o +h 0 
(6) 
Though the focus of the empirical section is not on the occurrence of peaceful means of 
transitioning from one governing group to another, it is useful to note that Equation 6 
implies that the expected benefits of revolt relative to peaceful dissent decline as the 
value of a rises (increase in effective democracy). Thus, the existence and efficacy of 
democratic institutions will playa role in determining the predicted likelihood of a 
revolution. 
These analyses indicate that preference for revolt or status quo cannot be 
determine without values for the parameters of cost, appropriation rates, likelihood of 
success, and the value of future economic power. However, it is possible to examine the 
manner in which the revolt benefit function, l't(-r), changes as various parameters 
increase or decrease. For instance, as the cost of a successful revolt rises or simply stays 
high enough, that is, as l rises or maintains relative dominance, the payoff of accepting 
the status quo increases or maintains relative to the payoff of revolt. An increase of this 
sort might derive from increased the government investing in increased military 
competence or poor internal infrastructure which dissident forces might use for transport. 
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What is of greater interest though is the role played by the economic parameters 
in the model in determining the relative benefit of revolt. Earlier work has focused on the 
influence of a shift in the growth rate of the economic resources from which each of the 
two groups draw. Assuming that the two groups are extracting at a composite rate greater 
than the raw growth rate of the stock, taking the partial of Equation 4 with respect to the 
growth parameter indicates that: 8(NR(T,» I 8~ < O. This means that as the economy 
grows, the relative benefit of revolting falls , and a reduction in the likelihood of political 
revolt follows. 
There is also the effect of changing extraction rates. How might the payoff of a 
revolt change as inequality in appropriation rates, or (y - 8), increases. In order to 
examine this effect, we take the partial of Equation 4 with respect to the oligarch 
extraction rate, which serves as increase in (y - 8) since the difference in extraction rates 
increases as the oligarch extraction rate rises and the dissident rate is held constant, 
8(N('r» I 8(y)*, indicates that we cannot sign the derivative. If, as in Blomberg, Hess, and 
Weerapana (2004) we were to assume that the likelihood of success was independent of 
the inequality of appropriation rates we would find that an increase in inequality would 
increase the payoff to a revolt. Intuitively this means that the more extreme the wealth of 
the government and poverty of the dissidents the greater the benefit of a revolt. 
However, as suggested above, if the likelihood of success in fact depends on how well 
each group can equip itself by expending a portion of its extraction, the likelihood of a 
successful revolt decreases as income inequality rises. It is fairly straightforward to 
recognize that at the extreme of absolute inequality, where the oligarchs appropriate all 
• See Appendix 1 
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economic resources and dissidents appropriate none, as well as absolute equality, the 
dissident group would not attack. In the case of absolute inequality due to its lack of 
resources with which to mount a revolt its likelihood of success would be zero, thus 
yielding no expected payoff. In the case of absolute equality there would be no economic 
motive to alter the level of appropriations through revolt. The expected benefit of 
revolting as income inequality increases takes on a parabolic shape, increasing as the 
dissident group gains the means by which to revolt and decreasing as their extraction rate 
grows closer and closer to equality with the oligarchs. Thus, the level of inequality that 
results in the highest expected payoff to revolt is moderately unequal extraction rates. 
It is interesting to note that the model allows for a higher likelihood of political 
revolt when the proportion of economic resources by appropriated by oligarchs increases 
even if there is growth in the economic stock appropriated by dissidents. This is to say 
that if the poor get richer and the rich get richer, but in such a way as to increase income 
inequality, the poor would be more likely to revolt. This does not seem as straight 
forward as a scenario where in income inequality rises while the income of the dissident 
group is static or decreasing. This effect of the model is a product of the assumed level 
of information; the extraction rate of each group is known by dissidents. A motive for 
revolt such as this is intimated by John Stuart Mills' observation that, "Men do not desire 
merely to be rich, but to be richer than other men."* 
• The theoretical model assumes that the relative level of appropriation of economic resources by dissidents 
and oligarchs is known by each group. In the case of the dissident group this is apparent in the role that the 
appropriation rate of oligarchs (1) plays in their benefit function. As the oligarchs' appropriation rate 
increases the total benefits accruing to dissidents falls. This is an assumption central to the model and is 
made by both Tomell (1998) and Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana (2004). 
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Extension of the Framework 
The model above provides a theoretical structure for the likelihood of political violence 
to be chosen by a potential dissident group in a single nation as a function of changes in 
economic circumstances. The issue of interest is the likelihood of revolt beginning in 
different countries in a given period oftime as a function ofthe income inequality in that 
period of time. Thus, there is an alteration in the conceptual scheme that underlies the 
mathematical model. In the above model, the dissident group extracts some portion of 
the common economic resource base. Over time if the resource base dwindles relative to 
the appropriation rates of the two groups either by way of economic contraction or an 
increase in the extraction rates of both groups, the likelihood of revolt increases. 
Additionally, if from one period to the next the appropriation rate of the oligarchs 
increases relative to that of the dissidents the dissident group demonstrates a higher 
probability of revolt. The general notion is that if the economic circumstances of the 
class of individuals who might participate in a revolt worsens over time, either in 
absolute terms or relative to their political opponents, they are more likely to revolt. This 
intuitively makes sense in that the group has conceptual reference to an earlier time 
period wherein their economic situation was not as bad. 
However, this paper examines the likelihood of a political revolt as a function of 
income inequality in different countries and different time periods. The elimination of 
the strictly temporal aspect ofthe model implies a different form of argument. The 
dissident group, rather than experiencing a change of their appropriation rate relative to 
the appropriation rate of oligarchs, experiences a static level of inequality. Though the 
conceptual justification changes, the new scenario can be represented by the above 
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framework in the same manner. In the model above, which is meant to represent the 
expected economic gains from a revolt, the determining factors (e.g. extraction rates, 
growth) are not linked to earlier periods. They are independent of the past in that 
extraction rates or growth rates of earlier periods do not affect the expected payoff 
function. This indicates that the model maybe be considered as temporally independent. 
The general intuition is that, ceteris paribus, higher income inequality in any given 
country will tend to increase the expected payoff of revolting (and thus the likelihood 
initiation of revolt) up to a point and then the extremity of inequality will decrease the 
expected success rate to such an extent as to make revolt not viable. 
4. Model 
To examine the empirical relationship between the relative appropriation rates of 
economic goods by those in power and those who might participate in a political revolt, 
the binary variable of "revolt initiation" will be regressed on the variables of income 
inequality, political rights, and the growth rate of the economy from the previous time 
period to the present period, among others. As indicated in the model, relative extraction 
rates playa role in determining the expected payoff of revolt. In order to examine this 
implication the Gini coefficient from 102 countries from 1972-1999 will serve as proxy 
for the differing extraction rates. Additionally, the growth rate of the common stock will 
be represented by the growth rate of the economy ofthe given country. The empirical 




Prob (Y=l) = --
I +eBX 
Y = 1 if a "revolt" is initiated in country j in year t 
o if a "revolt" is not initiated in country j in year t 
X = the vector including determinants [Xljt .. . X6jtl 
Xljt = Gini value in country j in year t 
X2jt = (Gini value in country j in year t) 2 
X3jt = Political rights value in country j in year t 
X4jt = Growth rate of the economy in country j from year (t-1) to year t 
X5jt = Urbanization rate 
X6jt = Cold War variable; 1 if year t falls before 1986 
o if year t is 1986 or later 
In measuring the relationship between continuous or categorical variables and the 
likelihood of an occurrence it is preferable to use a regression model that constrains the 
estimated outcome to fall within the interval (0,1) so that the likelihood of an event 
occurring is neither greater than 1 or less than O. In order to do this, a logit regression 
model is used. Instead of using Ordinary Least Squares to estimate the parameters for the 
regression, the parameters in logit models are estimated by maximum likelihood. Given 
k variables in the vector X this procedure determines estimates of (30 through (3k that 
maximize the likelihood of observing the sample. In large samples, maximum likelihood 
estimation renders estimators that are normally distributed, consistent, and best in that no 
alternative estimator has lower variances. * Another important aspect of the logit model is 
that Pm cannot be interpreted as the marginal effect of an increase in variable m on the 
• Hill, R., Griffiths, W., Judge, G. (2001 ) Undergraduate Econometrics p. 372-73. 
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dependent variable. Instead, the marginal effect of variable m on the dependent variable 
takes the form: aPr = fJ m e B:X 2. Thus, the marginal effect of an increase in the 
8xm (l+e) 
value of variable m depends upon Pm, the estimated coefficient values of each variable, 
and the values of variable Xl through Xk. 
5. Data 
Political Revolt 
The data used to determine if the dependent variable takes on a value of 1 or a is taken 
from the 2000 State Failure Task Force Report (SFTFR) (Goldstone, Gurr, and Harff, 
2000). The report-an updated version of the data used by Blomberg and Hess (2002)-
is a compilation and analysis of information from various institutions such as the World 
Bank and the United Nations that pertains to the character of and reasons for instability of 
political institutions and events of widespread violent conflict in most extant countries 
from 1955 to 1999. In order to be considered in this study, a conflict must have occurred 
in a nation with a population of 500,000 or more. The report uses a typology of conflict 
which assigns all the 114 state "failures" to one of five categories. 
Revolutionary War is a period of sustained conflict between the existing 
government and an organized and politically motivated group that aims to take power 
from the government in the whole country or a specific region. Ethnic War is a period of 
sustained conflict in which "national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities" 
challenge the government in order to prompt "major changes in their status." For a 
conflict to be included in either the Revolutionary War or Ethnic War categories more 
than 1,000 people must have participated and at least 100 people must have died in direct 
result of the conflict. Adverse Regime Changes are characterized by abrupt shifts in the 
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governmental structure that include state collapse, factional conflict within the ruling 
elite, and eventually lead to greater authoritarianism and narrowing of political rights. 
Genocides and Politic ides are policies enacted by the government or a dissident group 
that lead to the death of a "substantial portion of a communal or political group." And an 
event specified as Complex demonstrates characteristics from multiple categories. 
The conflicts between governmental and dissident groups in each of the four 
categories are characterized as being at least in part political. Every conflict in the 
category of Revolutionary War fit the criteria for a revolt. According to the definitions 
set forth by the SFTFR these revolts were undertaken with the aim of overthrowing the 
incumbent political group either nationally or in a region, and in some cases resulted in a 
successful deposition of the government. These conflicts are also assumed at a risk to the 
dissident group. 
The majority of events in the categories of Ethnic War and Genocides and 
Politicides were also included. However, there were a few events from each category 
that did not fit the description of extralegal political activity aimed at gaining political 
power for the dissident group. For example, the ethnic war between the Tutsis and the 
Hutus in Rwanda was politically motivated at first, and in each year of the SFTFR that 
the conflict was described as such the conflict is included in the data as a "revolt", but at 
various points in the conflict there were no clear political power motivations for the 
dissident group. Additionally, most genocides included in the report were conducted by 
governmental forces and thus do not fit the description of a revolt. Some politicides were 
undertaken by dissident groups within a country or region that were attempting to 
influence the government. These events were included as revolts given that there aims 
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implied an alteration of the policies of the iIl~umbent regime. Once again though, most 
politicides were carried out by the governing group and thus do not fit the criteria of a 
revolt. 
The category of Adverse Regime Changes was not considered an attempted revolt. 
The majority ofthese militant actions took the form of a coup. As discussed by Farcau 
(1994) and Goldstone, Gurr, and Harff (2000), most coups are carried out by authorities 
backed by the military. Those who are members of the military, the officer corps in 
particular-the main body from which coup leadership derives-are dependent upon the 
strength and existence of the military as an institution for their economic well-being. 
This implies that economic circumstances that tend to increase military strength and 
longevity such as increased taxes and investment in soldiering capacity are preferable 
circumstances. As the extraction rate of the oligarchs increases, through various means 
but especially through taxes, the motivation to attack the government declines. This 
indicates that the characteristics of the majority of coups are not the type of revolt 
examined in this paper, namely those where the dissident group is competing with the 
governmental group for a common resource. 
As mentioned above, an earlier paper examining the relationship between violent 
political conflict and income inequality by Muller and Seligman (1987) used the number 
of deaths related to political conflict per million to quantify the level of political conflict 
ina given country. This method differs from the method proposed in this paper in a few 
notable ways. Though their work is aimed at measuring the occurrence of revolutionary 
activity and in large part does, their use of "political deaths" relates the intensity of 
political conflict in general, not necessarily revolutionary conflict. As is evidenced by 
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the categories used in the SFTFR, political conflicts, and thus deaths related to political 
conflicts, can take a form other than that of a revolt be it an authoritarian coup, mass 
riots, terrorist activities, or otherwise. In including deaths that occur in the events that do 
not fit the criteria of a revolt, their conflict variable suffers a bias. Another important 
difference in their method is that it reflects the level of political conflict. The 
phenomenon that this paper examines is the choice of an organized to revolt as opposed 
to accept a state of status quo. The variable used to reflect conflict is binary and non-
continuous. Though the definitions used in the SFTFR implicitly assume a certain level 
of conflict, in terms of political deaths, in order for an event to qualify as a "state failure" 
rather than "terrorist attack" or "violent movement" this criterion doesn't distinguish 
between the intensity of violent conflicts that are considered "failures". This way of 
defining political conflict better fits the phenomenon of interest, namely, the probability 
of a choice being made to pursue violent conflict. 
Income Inequality 
The modeled relationship of relative appropriation rates of economic resources suggests 
that it would be desirable to use data that reflect the government and the constellation of 
groups that influence the policies of the government to represent the appropriation rate of 
"oligarchs". This might be accompanied by data for the demographic that tends to 
prompt and participate in revolutions. According to Huntington (1968), school teachers, 
and recent college graduates, along with peasant farmers and industrial workers represent 
the body of potential revolutionaries in most countries. In representing the extraction 
rates of each group we would wish to exclude the proportion of income accruing to 
sections of society indifferent to the occurrence of revolution or peace. 
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Obtaining data this precise was not feasible. Rather than using exact measures of 
the appropriations of each theoretical group to quantify levels of inequality, the Gini 
coefficient of income is used. Just as Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana (2004) used the 
growth rate of per capita GDP to infer the growth rate, ~, ofthe stock of assets, at, the 
income of portions of the population can be used to infer the relative dissident and 
oligarch extraction rates. The Gini index is a measure of the concentration of some 
characteristic or phenomenon, in this case the income distribution among the members of 
a country. The coefficient ranges from 0 to 100. High values indicate a high 
concentration of income and thus an unequal distribution while low values indicate low 
concentration and thus a relatively equal distribution. This measurement includes all 
members ofthe citizenry ofthe given country. This means that the incomes of those who 
do not have a clear interest in participating in or preventing a revolt are included in this 
measurement of income concentration. 
The use of the Gini coefficient as a measure of the distribution of the means by 
which members of a society obtain a given level of well-being has been criticized by 
many authors for various reasons. As for the measurable variable that should be used in 
the Gini calculation of "economic appropriation" inequality there are many opinions. 
The traditional variable used is the income of individuals or families. However it has 
been criticized for various reasons. In lieu of income, consumption and expenditure have 
been offered. Consumption is closer in relation to the intertemporal well-being of a 
family or individual than income, gross or net, if they are able to borrow or lend. Access 
to the capital markets necessary for the smoothing effect of borrowing and lending is 
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fairly common in most regions of the world." Additionally, underreporting is less of a 
problem with consumption than it is with income.s However, data on consumption rarely 
have been collected in many countries during the time period that will be examined. In 
the use of income data further problems are created by the variation in the definitions of 
"income" used by those who conduct the surveys. This though is remedied to a large 
extent in this study by the use of a consistent methodology in constructing income Ginis. 
The database used to collect income inequality data, the World Institute for 
Development Economics and Research (WIDER), reports over 3000 Gini coefficients for 
most countries in the world since the mid-1950s. As a result of the divergent views as to 
the manner in which Ginis should be calculated, WIDER reports many different types of 
Ginis. Dependent upon the attribute that was examined by each survey the Gini may be 
based upon expenditure differences, monet"'ry income differences, or various other 
indicators. However, for the sake of consistency of analysis WIDER uses a standardized 
method of calculating the Gini coefficients which is the same regardless of the variable 
reported. In addition to the standardized method of calculation, the database provides 
information as to what type of attribute the reported Gini is based on and the quality of 
information in the report. As might be imagined, different agencies in different nations 
are more or less assiduous in their collection of fine details about any of the economic 
indicators used for the Gini calculation. Thus, the database provides an index that ranges 
from 1-4 for the reliability of the information within the report upon which the calculated 
Gini is based. A value of 1 represents highest reliability and 4 represents lowest. 
• Ferranti, D., Perry, G., Ferreira, F., Walton, M. (2004) Inequality in Latin America: Breaking with 
History p.36 
9 Ibid. p.36 
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The methodology used to choose Ginis for the data in this work consisted of a few 
consistent steps. Primarily all observations in the WIDER database that were given a 
quality score of 4, the lowest, were eliminated from the data set. Next, each Deininger 
and Squire (2004) observation that was not calculated based on consumption or 
expenditure was included. Finally, the rest of the Ginis used were taken from different 
surveys based on the definition of income that the survey used. 
Due to survey costs each country in the sample set does not have a reported value 
of the Gini coefficient for each year. In order to avoid losing information from the 
political rights and economic growth variables, whose annual values are of interest, Gini 
values were constructed in a systematic ma.rmer for years within a five year proximity of 
observed Gini values. The observations that were presented in the database were used to 
interpolate and extrapolate these constructed Gini values. This method was used based 
on the relatively consistent trends of growth or contraction of the Gini in each country in 
the data set. Extreme changes-namely, of five percentage points or more- in one 
direction, either increasing or decreasing, and then immediately in the opposite direction 
in a period of ten years or less are extremely rare. This is to say that the data points of 
known Gini coefficients provided by WIDER do change, and at times in drastic ways, but 
they rarely exhibit extreme oscillations in brief time periods. Thus, linear interpolation 
between known Gini points and extrapolation in relatively short intervals is consistent 
with the generally smooth movements in the Gini coefficients. This method of 
calculation works as follows: if two data points fell within ten years of each other, a 
linear interpolation of Gini indices for each year was made between the two points. For 
instance, if Guinea had an observed Gini of 55.4 in 1975 and an observed Gini of 60.0 in 
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1978, the difference (4.6) divided by the number of years falling between the two 
observed periods (2) would render the value that would be added to the original Gini each 
year in which an interpolated point was used (thus, for the 1976 Gini 2.3 would be added 
to 55.4 and so on). 
Political Indicator 
In order to control for the effect that the type of regime would have on the decision of 
dissidents to revolt, the regression model incorporates data that measure the political 
rights accorded citizens of each nation. This information is taken from the Freedom 
House database. The data used in this paper come from their report on freedom in the 
world from 1972 to 2006. Political rights are defined as the ability of people "to 
participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct 
alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and 
organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies 
and are accountable to the electorate." Each country is assigned scores in subcategories 
concerning the electoral process, political pluralism, and the functionality of the 
government. The point totals in these subcategories are then used to determine the 
country's numerical ranking, ranging from 1 t07, which reflects the level of political 
freedom. Low scores (1-2) indicate a low level of governmental corruption and a high 
level of electoral functionality. Scores in the middle range (3-5) indicate that a country 
still demonstrates certain political freedoms even though the political climate is restricted 
by military involvement in the government, or unfair elections, or vestiges of royal 
power. Countries with a rating of 6 are ruled by a military junta, religious hierarchies, 
autocrats, or one-party dictatorships, yet may allow some representation of minority 
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groups and public opinion through petitions and consultation. In countries with a rating 
of 7, political rights are absent due to an extremely oppressive government. Freedom 
House also publishes a civil rights indicator, but the methodology used to calculate the 
ranking for this category includes the presence of civil conflict. This would create a 
problem of simultaneity and thus the political rights ranking was chosen to represent the 
availability of legal means of influencing the government. 
Growth 
To represent the growth of the stock of resources from which the oligarchs and dissidents 
extract the growth of the real GDP of each country from year (t-1) to year t is used. The 
data for growth is taken from the Penn World Table (Summer, Heston, and Aten, 2006). 
They calculate growth in real GDP using a chain series with prices adjusted for 2000 US 
dollars. Once again, this is an updated version of the data used by Blomberg and Hess 
(2002). 
Urbanization Rate 
The data used to measure the urbanization rates in each country over the period of 1972 
to 1999 were taken from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAD) ofthe United 
Nations. The variable was calculated by dividing the number of citizens living in an 
urban environment by the total popUlation. As mentioned in Muller and Seligson (1987) 
higher urbanization would tend to decrease the cost of organizing dissent. This may take 
the form of either legal or extralegal political dissent, thus the influence of urbanization 
on the likelihood of revolt is unclear. 
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Cold War 
The binary variable used to separate the effect that Cold War financing and instigation of 
civil conflict might have had on the potential difference in the likelihood of revolutions 
before and after the end of the Cold War. The end date of the Cold War is defined by the 
Malta summit held in December 1989 where Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush . 
officially declared an end to the Cold War (Wright, 2000). The effect of the Cold War on 
the probability of a revolt beginning in a given year is, like urbanization, not entirely 
clear. Though strategic financing of dissident movements by either the Soviet Union and 
or the United States may have increased the likelihood of the ability of dissident groups 
to initiate civil conflict, the opposite influence of deterrent funding by the opposite power 
might negate this effect of the Cold War. 
Table 1 
Gini Political Rights Growth Urbanization Revolution 
Countr~ Average Average Average Average Initiations 
Argentina 42.3 2.9 0.7 0.86 1 
Armenia 35.6 4.1 4.4 0.65 . 0 
Australia 33.8 1.0 2.0 0.87 0 
Austria 26.9 1.0 2.5 0.66 0 
Azerbaijan 31.8 5.8 0.9 0.51 
Bahamas 47.6 1.5 0.6 0.82 0 
Bangladesh 38.4 3.9 1.3 0.19 0 
Barbados 33.9 1.0 1.1 0045 0 
Belarus 27.0 5.1 7.3 0.69 0 
Belgium 27.4 1.0 2.3 0.96 0 
Bolivia 53.4 3.0 0.5 0.54 
Botswana 53.9 2.0 6.2 0041 0 
Brazil 60.5 3.0 2.0 0.73 0 
Bulgaria 27.3 5.3 -2.2 0.65 0 
Canada 31.4 1.0 2.1 0.77 0 
Chile 52.9 4.6 2.3 0.83 0 
China 30.7 6.6 7.2 0.28 
Colombia 56.7 2.4 1.9 0.68 
Costa Rica 47.1 1.0 1.4 0.53 0 
Cote d'Ivoire 46.9 6.0 0.6 0.39 0 
Croatia 34.6 3.9 -1.9 0.57 
Cuba 27.5 6.7 2.8 0.72 0 
Czech Republic 21.5 4.9 -0.1 0.74 0 
Denmark 31.1 1.0 1.7 0.84 0 
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Gini Political Rights Growth Urbanization Revolution 
Country Average Average Average Average Initiations 
Dominican Republic 47.5 2.9 2.9 0.54 0 
Ecuador 51.5 3.1 1.8 0.53 0 
Egypt 54.2 53 3.0 0.43 
EI Salvador 48.3 3.1 0.9 0.50 
Estonia 29.5 2.0 -0.7 0.70 0 
Finland 25.4 1.5 2.1 0.60 0 
France 32.6 1.0 2.1 0.74 0 
Georgia 32.8 4.1 -0.9 0.54 0 
Germany 31.2 1.8 2.0 0.86 0 
Ghana 54.2 5.4 0.8 0.35 0 
Greece 38.1 1.8 1.7 0.58 0 
Guatemala 54.7 3.6 0.7 0.41 0 
Haiti 59.2 6.1 0.5 0.29 2 
Honduras 55.3 3.5 0.6 0.40 0 
Hungary 23.4 4.1 2.3 0.61 0 
Indonesia 42.2 5.5 3.7 031 2 
Iran 45.4 5.6 0.4 0.56 2 
Iraq 63.0 6.9 4.5 0.68 
Israel 35.8 1.8 2.1 0.90 0 
Italy 35 .1 1.8 2.2 0.66 0 
Jamaica 61.4 1.9 0.1 0.50 0 
Japan 32.1 1.3 2.6 0.62 0 
Kazakhstan 34.7 5.8 -5.5 0.56 0 
Kenya 60.9 5.5 0.3 0.25 0 
Kyrgyzstan 34.0 4.4 -03 0.36 0 
Latvia 27.3 2.0 3.5 0.68 0 
Lebanon 60.4 4.9 7.7 0.81 0 
Lesotho 65.8 5.0 3.7 0.16 
Lithuania 26.9 1.4 2.3 0.67 0 
Macedonia 33.5 3.5 -0.8 0.59 0 
Madagascar 49.1 43 -1.8 0.22 0 
Malawi 46.3 5.5 2.1 0.11 1 
Malaysia 50.3 3.6 5.2 0.50 0 
Mauritania 73.6 6.5 0.6 0.42 0 
Mauritius 38.2 1.9 4.3 0.42 0 
Mexico 53.8 3.7 1.5 0.70 
Moldova 293 3.7 -3 .8 0.46 o . 
Morocco 56.6 4.5 1.8 0.46 
Nepal 53.6 3.8 1.7 0.09 0 
Netherlands 29.6 1.0 1.8 0.60 0 
New Zealand 35.1 1.0 1.2 0.84 0 
Nicaragua 55.6 4.5 -2.0 0.55 2 
Nigeria 52.8 53 03 0.35 
Norway 373 1.0 3.1 0 .72 0 
Pakistan 37.6 4.6 2.4 0.30 1 
Panama 54.5 4.6 2.6 0 .53 0 
Paraguay 47 .9 4.5 1.9 0.48 0 
Peru 54 .3 4.1 -0.2 0 .68 
Philippines 48.0 3.6 1.3 0.48 
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Gini Political Rights Growth Urbanization Revolution 
Countr~ Average Average Average Average Initiations 
Poland 24.9 4.2 2.7 0.60 0 
Portugal 35.8 1.7 3.1 0.42 0 
Romania 25.7 5.8 2.9 0.51 
Russia 32.4 5.4 -3.9 0.68 
Senegal 59.7 4.2 0.1 0.40 
Sierra Leone 48.2 5A -2.2 0.30 
Singapore 44.2 4.5 5.0 1.00 0 
Slovak Republic 22.3 5.2 0.1 0.57 0 
Slovenia 27.8 1.2 1.7 0.51 0 
South Africa 51.0 4.0 0.8 0.51 2 
South Korea 35.6 4.0 6.3 0.69 
Spain 33.2 1.9 2.4 0.74 0 
Sri Lanka 44.6 2.9 4.0 0.22 0 
Sweden 25.7 1.0 1.5 0.83 0 
Switzerland 34.6 1.0 1.0 0.64 0 
Tajikistan 28.6 6.1 -6.8 0.27 0 
Tanzania 57.1 5.8 1.7 0.22 0 
Thailand 51.9 3.6 4.7 0.29 2 
Trinidad &Tobago 46.6 1.3 1.3 0.68 0 
Turkey 49.1 3.1 2.1 0.55 
Turkmenistan 29.4 6.9 -3.6 0.45 0 
Uganda 46.0 5.4 0.1 0.10 0 
Ukraine 32.1 3.1 -7.0 0.67 0 
United Kingdom 32.9 1.0 2.1 0.88 0 
United States 42.0 1.0 2.3 0.75 0 
Uzbekistan 31.1 6.8 -1.0 0.38 0 
Venezuela 46.3 1.6 -0.2 0.83 0 
Zambia 66.2 4.7 -1.4 0.28 0 
Zimbabwe 68.5 5.0 0.7 0.33 0 
Sample 41.7 3.6 1.4 0.55 36 
Observations 1746 
All observations from 1972-1999. Revolts beginning before 1972 and continuing through the observed 
period were omitted as well as revolts occurring in years for which there was no reported Gini index, 
growth rate of per capita income, urbanization rate, or political rights variable. 
From Table 1 we can see that average Gini value ranges from 21.7 in the Czech Republic 
to 73.6 in Mauritania and the average Gini value over the entire sample is 41.7. The 
lowest average political rights value, 1, which indicates the highest level of political 
freedom, occurs only in Western Europe and anglophone countries with Barbados as the 
one exception. The highest average political rights indicator occurs unsurprisingly in 
Iraq. Over the entire sample the average political rights value is 3.6. The highest average 
growth rate for years in which there were available observations is 7.7 and occurred in 
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Lebanon. The lowest average growth rate over the time period occurred in Ukraine and is 
-7.0 while the sample average is 1.4. Nepal averages the lowest urbanization rate at 0.09 
while the entirety of Singapore's population is urbanized. The average urbanization rate 
over the entire sample is 0.55. Not all countries had even data across the time period of 
1972-1999. Thus, the panel of data is unbalanced. * 
6. Results 
As mentioned above a logit model is used to estimate the influence of income inequality 
on the likelihood of a political revolt. The results are reported below. The sign of each 
Table 2 








Political Ri~hts 0.366*** 
(0.100) 




Cold War 0.521 
(0.376) 
LR-statistic (6df) 40.38 
Prob. LR-statistic 0 
McFadden R-squared 0.115 
Total number of observations 1746 
Number of observations = 0 1710 
Number of observations = 1 36 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
* Statistical significance at the 90% level. 
** Statistical significance at the 95% level. 
*** Statistical significance at the 99% level. 
• For a table of the dates of revolts as well as the ranges of the Gini, political rights variable, and number of 
years of economic contraction see Appendices 2 anet3. 
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economic variable is as predicted. * As the value of the Gini coefficient and the political 
rights increase (recall that an increase in the political rights variable is an increase in 
authoritarianism, not democracy) the likelihood of revolution beginning increases, while 
an increase in the Gini value squared reduces the likelihood. The linear effect of income 
inequality on the likelihood of revolution is found to be statistically significant at the 90% 
level while income inequality squared does not have a statistically significant effect. On 
the other hand, the political rights variable and per capita GDP growth are both 
statistically significant at the 99% level. The urbanization rate and the Cold War 
variables are statistically insignificant. 
The LR statistic tests the joint null hypothesis that all slope coefficients are equal 
to zero, except for the constant. The reported probability of the LR statistic indicates that 
the variables are jointly significant at the 99% level. The McFadden R-squared value-
the analog to the R-squared value in OLS- is 0.115. This indicates a very low level of 
descriptive significance for the regression as a whole. 
As mentioned above, the marginal effect of variable m on the dependent variable 
aPr eBX 
in a logit model takes the form: -- = Pm BX 2 • To give an idea of how an unit 
fum (1+e) 
increase in any of the variables would affect the likelihood of a revolt being initiated it 
would be useful to evaluate this marginal effect at a variety of values. Listed below are 
the median values of each variable for five distinct regions of the world . 
• See Appendix 5 for a correlation table. Note the high correlation between urbanization rate 
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Table 3 
Median values by Region 
Region Gini Growth Political Rights Urbanization 
Africa 54.0 0.78 5 0.33 
Asia 39.5 4.07 4 0.33 
Europe & Nor. Am. 29.5 2.30 1 0.70 
Latin America 52.4 1.40 3 0.57 
Middle East 46.0 2.35 5 0.63 
Included in Europe and North Amenca are New Zealand and AustralIa. Latm Amenca also 
includes nations from the Caribbean. 
In order to evaluate the effect of an increase in inequality in the "median nation" in 
Africa, for instance, the median values of each variable and the parameter estimations of 
eBX 
~o through ~6 are used to determine the value of BX 2 . Then, multiplying this value 
(1 + e ) 
by the estimated coefficient of the variable of interest renders the effect of a unit increase 
of that variable on the likelihood of revolution commencing in the given year in the 
"median nation" of Africa. Below is a table of the marginal effect of a unit increase in 
each of the variables on the likelihood of revolution in the constructed median nations in 
each region. 
Table 4 
M . 1 fii d· argma e ects on me Ian countnes 
Region Gini Poit. Rights Growth Urbanization 
Africa 0.0030 0.0070 -0.00141 -0.0035 
Asia 0.0039 0.0092 -0.00185 -0.0046 
Europe and Nor. Am. 0.0010 0.0022 -0.00044 -0.0011 
Latin America 0.0038 0.0088 -0.00178 -0.0044 
Middle East 0.0030 0.0070 -0.00141 -0.0035 
All effects estImated for post-Cold War years 
Since the estimated parameters for each of the variables in the sample applies to each 
region the difference in the marginal effect of each of the variables across regions is 
determined by the magnitude of the summed vector of median variables and their 
corresponding coefficients for each region. Asia has the highest summed value of 
37 
BX 
e BX 2 ' SO a unit change in any of the variables has the greatest effect in the median 
(1 +e ) 
country in Asia while it has the lowest net effect in the median countries in Europe and 
North America. 
It would also be interesting to know the iikelihood of revolution occurring in the 
"average year" of the sample. In order to calculate this, the average values of each 
variable across the entire sample would be substituted into the logit model along with the 
estimated coefficients. Thus, on average, a country in a post-Cold War year preceding 
1999, accounting for income ineqUality, political openness, economic growth, and 
urbanization rate, would experience the initiation of a revolt with probability of: 
e -9 .75+0.l64( 41 .7)-0.001(1738.89)+0.366(3.6)-0.074(1.4)-0.185(0.55) 
Pr (Y=1) = 0.028 1 + e -9 .75+0.164( 41.7)-0.001(1738.89)+0.366(3.6)-0.074(1.4 )-0.185(0.55) 
7. Conclusion 
The theoretical model of economic costs and benefits faced by a dissident group that 
extracts resources from a common stock of resources (e.g. fish or lumber) shared by the 
government is developed and extended in this paper. While Blomberg, Hess, and 
Weerapana (2004) apply their model to individual countries over time, the model is here 
used to understand how the probability of a revolt being initiated in a given year would 
change with variations in economic variables as well as political variables across 
countries and over time. An additional alteration of the model of Blomberg, Hess, and 
Weerapana is incorporation of the relative extraction rates of the dissidents and oligarchs 
in the likelihood of successful revolt. This adjustment to the model implies a declining 
probability of success as extraction rate inequality increases. Declining expected success 
38 
but increasing payoff as inequality increases implies the highest rate of revolution 
initiation in instances of moderate income inequality. 
In empirically examining the effect of differing extraction rates by using the 
proxy of income inequality, while controlling for other variables the predicted effect of 
each variable was found. Higher income inequality increased the likelihood of revolt 
commencing in a given year but at a declining and eventually negative rate. However, 
the effect of the Gine on the probability of revolt initiation was not found to be 
statistically significant, nor was the effect of the Cold War or urbanization. The Gini was 
found to be statistically significant in its effect, but not at an extremely high level. 
Further examination of the effect of income inequality in the decision of dissident 
groups to violently revolt against the government would hopefully account for the level 
of divisiveness in each country in a given year. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) suggest 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization indices and measurements of the percentage of the 
population belonging to the dominant ethnic group. Variables for the level of education 
and literacy may playa role in determining the cost of revolt as well. 
Additional consideration might also be given to the role that expectations of the 




Partial of payoff to revolt with respect to y: 
~ N R (r) = (~)(_qR f+h (faoeCf3-r-o-p)s ds + B i (y - 8)aoeCf3-r-o-p)s ds) 
oy oy l+h 
= (:y) - qR f+h (faoeCf3-r-o-p)s ds + (:y)B [h (y - o)aOeCf3-r-o-p)s ds 
= (-y) - qR f+h (faoeCf3-r-o-p)s ds + (:y B) [h (y - 8)aoe(f3-r-o-p)s ds 
+B(~ i (y - o)aoe(f3-r-
o-p)sds) 
oy l+h 
= (y)qR f+h (faoeCf3-r-o-p)s ds + (:y B) [h (y - o)aoeCf3-r-o-p)s ds 
+ B( i a eCf3-r-o-p)s ds + i (yo - y2)a eCf3-r-o-p)s ds) 
l+h 0 l+h 0 
= (y)qR f+h Oa e(p-r-o-p)sds+(~(J) i (y - c5)a e(P-r-o-p)sds + (J( i (1+yc5-y2)a e(P-r-o-p)sds) 
l 0 8y l+h 0 l+h 0 
= (y)qR rh Oaoe(P-r-o-p)s ds + [(:y (J)(y - c5) + (J(1 + yS - y2)] lh aoe(p-r-o-p)s ds 
The constant of oligarch extraction rate multiplied by the proportion of income expended 
by the dissident group comes out to a positive value. The partial derivative of the 
likelihood of success, e, is known to be negative, that is, as the oligarch extraction rate 
increases the likelihood of successful revolt falls. Given that the oligarch extraction rate 
is known to exceed the dissident extraction rate, the first product within the brackets is 
negative. In spite of knowing that the oligarch extraction rate squared is greater than the 
product of the oligarch extraction rate and the dissident extraction rate, we cannot sign 




Dates of "revolts" 
Country Start Date End Date Country Start Date End Date 
Argentina 1977 1980 Malawi 1977 1977 
Azerbaijan 1988 1997 Mexico 1994 1994 
Bolivia 1980 1980 Morocco 1975 1989 
China 1988 1997 Nicaragua 1978 .1980 
China 1989 1989 Nicaragua 1981 1990 
Colombia 1984 nJa Nigeria 1980 1981 
Croatia 1991 1995 Pakistan 1971 1971 
Egypt 1986 1996 Peru 1982 1997 
EI Salvador 1979 1992 Philippines 1972 nJa 
Haiti 1986 1986 Russia 1991 1996 
Haiti 1991 1991 Senegal 1991 nJa 
Indonesia 1975 1992 Sierra Leone 1991 nJa 
Indonesia 1997 nJa South Africa 1976 1977 
Iran 1977 1979 South Africa 1984 1996 
Iran 1981 1983 Sri Lanka 1983 nJa 
Iraq 1980 nla Thailand 1976 1978 
South Korea 1979 1979 Thailand 1993 nJa 
Lesotho 1998 1998 Turkey 1984 nJa 
Dates of revolution commencement and conclusion taken from the State Failure Task Report 
(2000). These are the revolts that occur between 1972 and 1999 and have corresponding 
observations for the various economic and political determinants listed above. An entry of nla 




Ranges of Gini values, Eolitical rights, i:ears of economic contraction 
Gini Political Rights Years of Negative 
Country Range Range Growth 
Argentina 36.1 , 47.9 1, 6 11 
Armenia 25.9, 62.5 3,5 
Australia 29.4,39.4 1, 1 4 
Austria 22.7, 31.6 1, 1 3 
Azerbaijan 25.2, 50.1 5,6 2 
Bahamas 39.1, 62.5 1,2 12 
Bangladesh 33.6, 45.0 2, 7 8 
Barbados 30.9, 46.4 1, 1 10 
Belarus 22.7, 29.7 4,6 0 
Belgium 22.5, 32.1 1, 1 4 
Bolivia 49.4, 60.2 1,7 10 
Botswana 53.7, 54.0 1, 3 3 
Brazil 57.9, 64.0 2,5 9 
Bulgaria 17.8, 42.2 2, 7 5 
Canada 27.4, 33.9 1, 1 4 
Chile 44.0, 57.2 1,7 6 
China 27.3, 37.3 6, 7 
Colombia 50.8, 63.7 2,4 4 
Costa Rica 43.2, 48.1 1, 1 7 
Cote d'Ivoire 43 .9, 50.6 6, 6 15 
Croatia 31.2, 37.9 3,4 3 
Cuba 27.0, 28.3 6, 7 9 
Czech Republic 18.7, 26.5 1,7 3 
Denmark 22.5, 40.6 1, 1 6 
Dominican Republic 43.4, 53 .0 1, 4 4 
Ecuador 44.4, 58.8 2, 7 9 
Egypt 54.2, 54.2 4,6 4 
EI Salvador 44.9, 56.0 2, 5 8 
Estonia 24.0, 40.1 1,3 4 
Finland 19.6, 30.9 1,2 6 
France 29.3, 42.5 1, 1 2 
Georgia 24.8, 49.8 3,6 3 
Germany 27.3, 39.3 1,2 5 
Ghana 50.9, 63.2 3, 7 6 
Greece 32.6, 44.9 1,7 9 
Guatemala 54.0, 56.0 2,6 10 
Haiti 59.2, 59.2 4, 7 12 
Honduras 52.7, 59.1 2, 7 8 
Hungary 20.9, 29.2 1, 6 6 
Indonesia 38.7, 51.0 4, 7 6 
Iran 43.6, 46 .0 5,6 13 
Iraq 63.0, 63.0 6, 7 13 
Israel 34.8, 37.2 1,2 6 
42 
Gini Political Rights Years of Negative 
Countr:y Range Range Growth 
Italy 30.4, 42.1 1,2 3 
Jamaica 54.0, 65.5 1,2 17 
Japan 21.9, 36.9 1,2 4 
Kazakhstan 25.7, 53.0 5,6 5 
Kenya 57.0, 70.0 4, 7 13 
Kyrgyzstan 24.3, 61.3 4,5 2 
Latvia 22.5, 34.6 1,3 ° 
Lebanon 60.4, 60.4 2,6 2 
Lesotho 63.0, 69.0 3,7 10 
Lithuania 23 .7, 33.7 1,2 2 
Macedonia 29.5, 45.3 3,4 5 
Madagascar 39.1, 62.5 2,6 21 
Malawi 42.5, 53.1 2,7 9 
Malaysia 49.1, 50.6 2,5 4 
Mauritania 71.4, 76.2 6, 7 7 
Mauritius 35.2, 41.9 1,3 2 
Mexico 49.9, 59.2 3,5 6 
Moldova 22.9, 40.5 2,5 5 
Morocco 54.0, 59.0 3,6 3 
Nepal 52.0, 54.6 3,6 5 
Netherlands 25.8, 34.4 1, 1 4 
New Zealand 30.2, 40.1 1, 1 8 
Nicaragua 55.5, 55.7 2,5 17 
Nigeria 47.9, 61.8 2, 7 14 
Norway 31.3, 43.5 1, 1 1 
Pakistan 34.0, 41.0 3,7 3 
Panama 47.6, 58.7 1, 7 8 
Paraguay 39.8, 62.1 3,6 11 
Peru 50.9, 57.0 2, 7 14 
Philippines 45.5, 53.3 2,5 11 
Poland 20. 1, 31.0 1,6 7 
Portugal 32.9, 42.1 1,5 4 
Romania 20.4, 29.4 2, 7 9 
Russia 23.9, 47.6 3,7 7 
Senegal 43.0, 68.0 3,6 10 
Sierra Leone 46.0, 49.0 3,7 13 
Singapore 37.0, 47.0 4,5 3 
Slovak Republic 18.6, 26.3 1, 7 4 
Slovenia 19.9, 30.7 1, 2 2 
South Africa 45.0, 60.0 1, 5 8 
South Korea 31 .6, 40.2 2,5 2 
Spain 31.5, 34.2 1, 5 5 
Sri Lanka 40.9, 47.5 2, 4 2 
Sweden 19.9, 36.7 1, 2 6 
Switzerland 30.9, 35.9 1, 1 5 
Tajikistan 25.2, 33.4 3, 7 5 
Tanzania 43.3, 72.0 4,6 16 
Thailand 42.8, 58.5 2, 7 4 
Trinidad &Tobago 41.7, 51.7 1, 2 12 
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Gini Political Rights Years of Negative 
Countr~ Range Range Growth 
Turkey 43.8, 52.0 2,5 9 
Turkmenistan 25.4, 35.8 6, 7 3 
Uganda 39.9, 54.6 4, 7 6 
Ukraine 21.9, 47.0 3,4 5 
United Kingdom 30.9, 35.2 1, 1 5 
United States 37.4, 45.9 1, 1 5 
Uzbekistan 24.8, 48.1 6, 7 4 
Venezuela 42.6, 51.2 1,4 14 
Zambia 55.6, 77.6 2,6 13 


















Growth Gini Cold war 
0.048 -0.365 -0.148 
0.005 0.335 0.162 
1.000 -0.080 0.059 
-0.080 1.000 -0.056 
0.059 -0.056 1.000 
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